This chapter describes how to configure IKE for your systems. After IKE is configured, it automatically generates keying material for IPsec on your network. This chapter contains the following information:Configuring IKE (Task Map) Configuring IKE With Preshared Keys (Task Map) Configuring IKE With Public Key Certificates (Task Map) Configuring IKE for Mobile Systems (Task Map) Configuring IKE to Find Attached Hardware (Task Map) Changing IKE Transmission Parameters (Task Map) For overview information about IKE, see Chapter 22, Internet Key Exchange (Overview). For reference information about IKE, see Chapter 24, Internet Key Exchange (Reference). For more procedures, see the Examples sections of the ikeadm1M, ikecert1M, and ike.config4 man pages. You can use preshared keys, self-signed certificates, and certificates from a Certificate Authority (CA) to authenticate IKE. A rule links the particular IKE authentication method with the end points that are being protected. Therefore, you can use one or all IKE authentication methods on a system. A pointer to a PKCS #11 library enables certificates to use an attached hardware accelerator.After configuring IKE, complete the IPsec task that uses the IKE configuration. The following table refers you to task maps that focus on a specific IKE configuration.Task Description For Instructions Configure IKE with preshared keys Protects communications between two systems by having the systems share a secret key. Configuring IKE With Preshared Keys (Task Map) Configure IKE with public key certificates Protects communications with public key certificates. The certificates can be self-signed, or they can be vouched for by a PKI organization. Configuring IKE With Public Key Certificates (Task Map) Cross a NAT boundary Configures IPsec and IKE to communicate with a mobile system Configuring IKE for Mobile Systems (Task Map) Configure IKE to generate and store public key certificates on attached hardware Enables a Sun Crypto Accelerator 1000 board or a Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board to accelerate IKE operations. Also enables the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board to store public key certificates. Configuring IKE to Find Attached Hardware (Task Map) Tune Phase 1 key negotiation parameters Changes the timing of IKE key negotiations. Changing IKE Transmission Parameters (Task Map) The following table points to procedures to configure and maintain IKE with preshared keys.Task Description For Instructions Configure IKE with preshared keys Creates an IKE policy file and one key to be shared. How to Configure IKE With Preshared Keys Refresh preshared keys on a running IKE system Adds fresh keying material for IKE on communicating systems. How to Refresh IKE Preshared Keys Add preshared keys to a running IKE system Adds a new IKE policy entry and new keying material to a system that is currently enforcing IKE policy. How to Add an IKE Preshared Key for a New Policy Entry in ipsecinit.conf Check that preshared keys are identical Displays the preshared keys on both systems to see that the keys are identical. How to Verify That IKE Preshared Keys Are Identical Preshared keys is the simplest authentication method for IKE. If you are configuring two systems to use IKE, and you are the administrator for both of the systems, using preshared keys is a good choice. However, unlike public key certificates, preshared keys are tied to particular IP addresses. Preshared keys cannot be used with mobile systems or systems that might be renumbered. Also, when you use preshared keys, you cannot offload IKE computations to attached hardware.The IKE implementation offers algorithms whose keys vary in length. The key length that you choose is determined by site security. In general, longer keys provide more security than shorter keys.These procedures use the system names enigma and partym. Substitute the names of your systems for the names enigma and partym. On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. On each system, copy the file /etc/inet/ike/config.sample to the file /etc/inet/ike/config. Enter rules and global parameters in the ike/config file on each system.The rules and global parameters in this file should permit the IPsec policy in the system's ipsecinit.conf file to succeed. The following ike/config examples work with the ipsecinit.conf examples in How to Secure Traffic Between Two Systems With IPsec.For example, modify the /etc/inet/ike/config file on the enigma system:### ike/config file on enigma, 192.168.116.16 ## Global parameters # ## Phase 1 transform defaults p1_lifetime_secs 14400 p1_nonce_len 40 # ## Defaults that individual rules can override. p1_xform { auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha encr_alg des } p2_pfs 2 # ## The rule to communicate with partym # Label must be unique { label "enigma-partym" local_addr 192.168.116.16 remote_addr 192.168.13.213 p1_xform { auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des } p2_pfs 5 }All arguments to the auth_method parameter must be on the same line. Modify the /etc/inet/ike/config file on the partym system:### ike/config file on partym, 192.168.13.213 ## Global Parameters # p1_lifetime_secs 14400 p1_nonce_len 40 # p1_xform { auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha encr_alg des } p2_pfs 2 ## The rule to communicate with enigma # Label must be unique { label "partym-enigma" local_addr 192.168.13.213 remote_addr 192.168.116.16 p1_xform { auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des } p2_pfs 5 } On each system, check the validity of the file.# /usr/lib/inet/in.iked -c -f /etc/inet/ike/config Generate random numbers for use as keying material. If your site has a random number generator, use that generator. On a Solaris system, you can use the od command. For example, the following command prints two lines of hexadecimal numbers:% od -X -A n /dev/random | head -2 f47cb0f4 32e14480 951095f8 2b735ba8 0a9467d0 8f92c880 68b6a40e 0efe067dFor an explanation of the od command, see How to Generate Random Numbers on a Solaris System and the od1 man page.Other operating systems can require ASCII keying material. To generate the identical key in hexadecimal and ASCII formats, see Example 23–1. From the output of Step 5, construct one key.f47cb0f432e14480951095f82b735ba80a9467d08f92c88068b6a40eThe authentication algorithm in this procedure is MD5, as shown in Step 3. The size of the hash, that is, the size of the authentication algorithm's output, determines the minimum recommended size of a preshared key. The output of the MD5 algorithm is 128 bits, or 32 characters. The example key is 56 characters long, which provides additional keying material for IKE to use. Create the file /etc/inet/secret/ike.preshared on each system.Put the preshared key in each file.For example, on the enigma system, the ike.preshared file would appear similar to the following:# ike.preshared on enigma, 192.168.116.16 #… { localidtype IP localid 192.168.116.16 remoteidtype IP remoteid 192.168.13.213 # enigma and partym's shared key in hex (192 bits) key f47cb0f432e14480951095f82b735ba80a9467d08f92c88068b6a40e } On the partym system, the ike.preshared file would appear similar to the following:# ike.preshared on partym, 192.168.13.213 #… { localidtype IP localid 192.168.13.213 remoteidtype IP remoteid 192.168.116.16 # partym and enigma's shared key in hex (192 bits) key f47cb0f432e14480951095f82b735ba80a9467d08f92c88068b6a40e } The preshared keys on each system must be identical. Solaris IPsec interoperates with other operating systems. If your system is communicating with a system that requires ASCII preshared keys, you need to generate one key in two formats, ASCII and hexadecimal.In this example, the Solaris system administrator wants 56 characters of keying material. The administrator uses the following command to generate a hexadecimal key from an ASCII passphrase. The option tx1 prints the bytes one at a time on all Solaris systems.# /bin/echo "papiermache with cashews and\c" | od -tx1 | cut -c 8-55 | \ tr -d '\n' | tr -d ' ' | awk '{print}' 7061706965726d616368652077697468206361736865777320616e64By removing the offsets and concatenating the hexadecimal output, the hexadecimal key for the Solaris system is 7061706965726d616368652077697468206361736865777320616e64. The administrator places this value in the ike.preshared file on the Solaris system.# Shared key in hex (192 bits) key 7061706965726d616368652077697468206361736865777320616e64On the system that requires ASCII preshared keys, the passphrase is the preshared key. The Solaris system administrator telephones the other administrator with the passphrase, papiermache with cashews and. This procedure assumes that you want to replace an existing preshared key at regular intervals without rebooting. If you use a strong encryption algorithm, such 3DES or Blowfish, you might want to refresh keys just before you reboot both systems. On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Generate random numbers and construct a key of the appropriate length.For details, see How to Generate Random Numbers on a Solaris System. If you are generating a preshared key for a Solaris system that is communicating with an operating system that requires ASCII, see Example 23–1. Replace the current key with a new key.For example, on the hosts enigma and partym, you would replace the value of key in the /etc/inet/secret/ike.preshared file with a new number of the same length. Check the privilege level of the in.iked daemon.# /usr/sbin/ikeadm get priv Current privilege level is 0x0, base privileges enabledYou can change the keying material if the command returns a privilege level of 0x1 or 0x2. Level 0x0 does not permit operations to modify or view keying material. By default, the in.iked daemon runs at the 0x0 level of privilege.If the privilege level is 0x0, kill and restart the daemon.When the daemon restarts, it reads the new version of the ike.preshared file.# pkill in.iked # /usr/lib/inet/in.iked If the privilege level is 0x1 or 0x2, read in the new version of the ike.preshared file.# ikeadm read preshared You must have one preshared key for every policy entry in the ipsecinit.conf file. If you add a new policy entry while IPsec and IKE are running, the in.iked daemon can read in new keys. This procedure assumes the following:The enigma system is set up as described in How to Configure IKE With Preshared Keys. The enigma system is going to protect its traffic with a new system, ada. The in.iked daemon is running on both systems. The systems' interfaces are included as entries in the /etc/hosts file on both systems. The following entry is an example.192.168.15.7 ada 192.168.116.16 enigmaThis procedure also works with an IPv6 address. In Solaris Express, Developer Edition 2/07, IPv6 addresses are placed in the /etc/hosts file. You have added a new policy entry to the /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf file on both systems. The entries appear similar to the following:# ipsecinit.conf file for enigma {laddr enigma raddr ada} ipsec {auth_algs any encr_algs any sa shared}# ipsecinit.conf file for ada {laddr ada raddr enigma} ipsec {auth_algs any encr_algs any sa shared} On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Create a rule for IKE to manage the keys for enigma and ada.For example, the rule in the /etc/inet/ike/config file on the enigma system appears similar to the following:### ike/config file on enigma, 192.168.116.16 … ## The rule to communicate with ada {label "enigma-to-ada" local_addr 192.168.116.16 remote_addr 192.168.15.7 p1_xform {auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg blowfish} p2_pfs 5 } The rule in the /etc/inet/ike/config file on the ada system appears similar to the following:### ike/config file on ada, 192.168.15.7 … ## The rule to communicate with enigma {label "ada-to-enigma" local_addr 192.168.15.7 remote_addr 192.168.116.16 p1_xform {auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg md5 encr_alg blowfish} p2_pfs 5 } Check the privilege level of the in.iked daemon.# /usr/sbin/ikeadm get priv Current privilege level is 0x0, base privileges enabledIf the privilege level is 0x1 or 0x2, continue with the next step. If the privilege level is 0x0, stop the daemon. Then, restart the daemon with the appropriate privilege level.# pkill in.iked # /usr/lib/inet/in.iked -p 2 Setting privilege level to 2! Generate random numbers and construct a key of 64 to 448 bits.For details, see How to Generate Random Numbers on a Solaris System. If you are generating a preshared key for a Solaris system that is communicating with an operating system that requires ASCII, see Example 23–1. By some means, send the key to the administrator of the remote system.You both need to add the same preshared key at the same time. Your key is only as safe as the safety of your transmission mechanism. An out-of-band mechanism, such as registered mail or a protected fax machine, is best. Add the new keying material with the add preshared subcommand in ikeadm command mode.ikeadm> add preshared { localidtype id-type localid id remoteidtype id-type remoteid id ike_mode mode key key }id-typeSpecifies the type of the id. idSpecifies the IP address when id-type is IP. modeSpecifies the IKE mode. The only accepted value is main. keySpecifies the preshared key in hexadecimal format. For example, on host enigma, you would add the key for the remote system, ada, and exit the ikeadm interactive mode.# ikeadm ikeadm> add preshared { localidtype ip localid 192.168.116.16 remoteidtype ip remoteid 192.168.15.7 key 8d1fb4ee500e2bea071deb2e781cb48374411af5a9671714672bb1749ad9364d } ikeadm: Successfully created new preshared key. ikeadm> exit # On host ada, you would add the identical key for the remote system, enigma, and exit the interactive mode.# ikeadm ikeadm> add preshared { localidtype ip localid 192.168.15.7 remoteidtype ip remoteid 192.168.116.16 key 8d1fb4ee500e2bea071deb2e781cb48374411af5a9671714672bb1749ad9364d } ikeadm: Successfully created new preshared key. ikeadm> exit # On each system, lower the privilege level of the in.iked daemon.# ikeadm set priv base On each system, activate the ipsecinit.conf file to secure the added interface.# ipsecconf -a /etc/inet/ipsecinit.confRead the warning when you execute the ipsecconf command. The same warning applies to restarting the in.iked daemon. A socket that is already latched, that is, the socket is in use, provides an unsecured back door into the system. For more extensive discussion, see Security Considerations for ipsecinit.conf and ipsecconf. On each system, read in the new rules by using the ikeadm command.# ikeadm read rulesYou created the rules in Step 2. Because the rules are in the /etc/inet/ike/config file, the name of the file does not have to be specified to the ikeadm command. Ensure that IKE preshared keys are available at reboot.Add the keys to the /etc/inet/secret/ike.preshared file.For example, on the enigma system, you would add the following keying information to the ike.preshared file:# ike.preshared on enigma for the ada interface #… { localidtype IP localid 192.168.116.16 remoteidtype IP remoteid 192.168.15.7 # enigma and ada's shared key in hex (32 - 448 bits required) key 8d1fb4ee500e2bea071deb2e781cb48374411af5a9671714672bb1749ad9364d } On the ada system, you would add the following keying information to the ike.preshared file:# ike.preshared on ada for the enigma interface #… { localidtype IP localid 192.168.15.7 remoteidtype IP remoteid 192.168.116.16 # ada and enigma's shared key in hex (32 - 448 bits required) key 8d1fb4ee500e2bea071deb2e781cb48374411af5a9671714672bb1749ad9364d } Verify that the systems can communicate.See How to Verify That IKE Preshared Keys Are Identical. If the preshared keys on the communicating systems are not identical, the systems cannot authenticate. IPsec has been configured and is enabled between the two systems that you are testing. On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Check the privilege level of the in.iked daemon.# /usr/sbin/ikeadm get priv Current privilege level is 0x0, base privileges enabledIf the privilege level is 0x1 or 0x2, continue with the next step. If the privilege level is 0x0, stop the daemon. Then, restart the daemon with the appropriate privilege level.# pkill in.iked # /usr/lib/inet/in.iked -p 2 Setting privilege level to 2! On each system, view the preshared key information.# ikeadm dump preshared PSKEY: Preshared key (24 bytes): f47cb…/192 LOCIP: AF_INET: port 0, 192.168.116.16 (enigma). REMIP: AF_INET: port 0, 192.168.13.213 (partym). Compare the two dumps.If the preshared keys are not identical, replace one key with the other key in the /etc/inet/secret/ike.preshared file. When the verification is complete, lower the privilege level of the in.iked daemon on each system.# ikeadm set priv base The following table provides pointers to procedures for creating public key certificates for IKE. The procedures include how to accelerate and store the certificates on attached hardware.Task Description For Instructions Configure IKE with self-signed public key certificates Creates and places two certificates on each system:A self-signed certificate The public key certificate from the remote system How to Configure IKE With Self-Signed Public Key Certificates Configure IKE with a PKI Certificate Authority Creates a certificate request, and then places three certificates on each system:The certificate that the Certificate Authority (CA) creates from your request The public key certificate from the CA The CRL from the CA How to Configure IKE With Certificates Signed by a CA Configure public key certificates on local hardware Involves one of: Generating a self-signed certificate on the local hardware and then adding the public key from a remote system to the hardware. Generating a certificate request on the local hardware and then adding the public key certificates from the CA to the hardware. How to Generate and Store Public Key Certificates on Hardware Update the certificate revocation list (CRL) from a PKI Accesses the CRL from a central distribution point. How to Handle a Certificate Revocation List Public key certificates eliminate the need for communicating systems to share secret keying material out of band. Unlike preshared keys, a public key certificate can be used on a mobile machine or on a system that might be renumbered.Public key certificates can also be stored on attached hardware. For the procedure, see Configuring IKE to Find Attached Hardware (Task Map).Self-signed certificates require less overhead than public certificates from a CA, but do not scale very easily. On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Add a self-signed certificate to the ike.privatekeys database. # ikecert certlocal -ks|-kc -m keysize -t keytype \ -D dname -A altname \ [S validity-start-time] [F validity-end-time] [T token-IDksCreates a self-signed certificate. kcCreates a certificate request. For the procedure, see How to Configure IKE With Certificates Signed by a CA. m keysizeIs the size of the key. The keysize can be 512, 1024, 2048, 3072, or 4096. t keytypeSpecifies the type of algorithm to use. The keytype can be rsa-sha1, rsa-md5, or dsa-sha1. D dnameIs the X.509 distinguished name for the certificate subject. The dname typically has the form: C=country, O=organization, OU=organizational unit, CN=common name. Valid tags are C, O, OU, and CN. A altnameIs the alternate name for the certificate. The altname is in the form of tag=value. Valid tags are IP, DNS, email, and DN. S validity-start-timeProvides an absolute or relative valid start time for the certificate. F validity-end-timeProvides an absolute or relative valid end time for the certificate. T token-IDEnables a PKCS #11 hardware token to generate the keys. The certificates are then stored in the hardware. For example, the command on the partym system would appear similar to the following:# ikecert certlocal -ks -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 \ -D "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" \ -A IP=192.168.13.213 Creating software private keys. Writing private key to file /etc/inet/secret/ike.privatekeys/0. Enabling external key providers - done. Acquiring private keys for signing - done. Certificate: Proceeding with the signing operation. Certificate generated successfully (…/publickeys/0) Finished successfully. Certificate added to database. -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MIICLTCCAZagAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBNMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEX … 6sKTxpg4GP3GkQGcd0r1rhW/3yaWBkDwOdFCqEUyffzU -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- The command on the enigma system would appear similar to the following:# ikecert certlocal -ks -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 \ -D "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" \ -A IP=192.168.116.16 Creating software private keys. … Certificate added to database. -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MIICKDCCAZGgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBJMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEV … jpxfLM98xyFVyLCbkr3dZ3Tvxvi732BXePKF2A== -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- Save the certificate and send it to the remote system.You can paste the certificate into an email.For example, you would send the following partym certificate to the enigma administrator:To: admin@ja.enigmaexample.com From: admin@us.partyexample.com Message: -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MIICLTCCAZagAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBNMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEX … 6sKTxpg4GP3GkQGcd0r1rhW/3yaWBkDwOdFCqEUyffzU -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- The enigma administrator would send you the following enigma certificate:To: admin@us.partyexample.com From: admin@ja.enigmaexample.com Message: -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MIICKDCCAZGgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBJMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEV … jpxfLM98xyFVyLCbkr3dZ3Tvxvi732BXePKF2A== -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- Verify with the other administrator that the keys have not been tampered with.For example, you can phone the other administrator to compare the values of the public key hash. The public key hash for the shared certificate should be identical on the two systems. List the stored certificate on your system.For example, on the partym system, the public certificate is in slot 1, and the private certificate is in slot 0.partym # ikecert certdb -l Certificate Slot Name: 0 Type: rsa-md5 Private Key Subject Name: <C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym> Key Size: 1024 Public key hash: B2BD13FCE95FD27ECE6D2DCD0DE760E2 Certificate Slot Name: 1 Type: rsa-md5 Public Certificate (Private key in certlocal slot 0) Points to certificate's private key Subject Name: <C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax> Key Size: 1024 Public key hash: 2239A6A127F88EE0CB40F7C24A65B818 Compare this value with the public key hash on the enigma system.You can read the public key hash over the phone.enigma # ikecert certdb -l Certificate Slot Name: 4 Type: rsa-md5 Private Key Subject Name: <C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax> Key Size: 1024 Public key hash: DF3F108F6AC669C88C6BD026B0FCE3A0 Certificate Slot Name: 5 Type: rsa-md5 Public Certificate (Private key in certlocal slot 4) Subject Name: <C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym> Key Size: 1024 Public key hash: 2239A6A127F88EE0CB40F7C24A65B818 On each system, trust both certificates.Edit the /etc/inet/ike/config file to recognize the certificates.The administrator of the remote system provides the values for the cert_trust, remote_addr, and remote_id parameters.For example, on the partym system, the ike/config file would appear similar to the following:# Explicitly trust the following self-signed certs # Use the Subject Alternate Name to identify the cert # Verified remote address and remote ID # Verified public key hash per phone call from administrator cert_trust "192.168.13.213" Local system's certificate Subject Alt Name cert_trust "192.168.116.16" Remote system's certificate Subject Alt Name ## Parameters that may also show up in rules. p1_xform { auth_method preshared oakley_group 5 auth_alg sha encr_alg des } p2_pfs 5 { label "US-partym to JA-enigmax" local_id_type dn local_id "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" remote_id "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" local_addr 192.168.13.213 remote_addr 192.168.116.16 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 2 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des} } On the enigma system, add enigma values for local parameters in the ike/config file.For the remote parameters, use partym values. Ensure that the value for the label keyword is unique. This value must be different from the remote system's label value.… { label "JA-enigmax to US-partym" local_id_type dn local_id "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" remote_id "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" local_addr 192.168.116.16 remote_addr 192.168.13.213 … On each system, add the certificate that you received. Copy the public key from the administrator's email. Type the ikecert certdb -a command and press the Return key. No prompts display when you press the Return key.# ikecert certdb -a Press the Return key Paste the public key. Then press the Return key. To end the entry, press Control-D.-----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MIIC… … ----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- Press the Return key <Control>-D The administrator on the machine partym establishes dates within which the certificate is valid. The certificate is backdated by 2 1/2 days, and is valid for 4 years and 6 months from the date of creation.# ikecert certlocal -ks -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 \ -D "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" \ -A IP=192.168.13.213 \ -S -2d12h -F +4y6mThe administrator on the machine enigma establishes dates within which the certificate is valid. The certificate is backdated by 2 days, and is valid until midnight of December 31, 2010.# ikecert certlocal -ks -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 \ -D "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" \ -A IP=192.168.116.16 \ -S -2d -F "12/31/2010 12:00 AM" Public certificates from a Certificate Authority (CA) require negotiation with an outside organization. The certificates very easily scale to protect a large number of communicating systems. On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Use the ikecert certlocal -kc command to create a certificate request.For a description of the arguments to the command, see Step 2 in How to Configure IKE With Self-Signed Public Key Certificates.# ikecert certlocal -kc -m keysize -t keytype \ -D dname -A altnameFor example, the following command creates a certificate request on the partym system:# ikecert certlocal -kc -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 \ > -D "C=US, O=PartyCompany\, Inc., OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" \ > -A "DN=C=US, O=PartyCompany\, Inc., OU=US-Partym" Creating software private keys. Writing private key to file /etc/inet/secret/ike.privatekeys/2. Enabling external key providers - done. Certificate Request: Proceeding with the signing operation. Certificate request generated successfully (…/publickeys/0) Finished successfully. -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIByjCCATMCAQAwUzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxHTAbBgNVBAoTFEV4YW1wbGVDb21w … lcM+tw0ThRrfuJX9t/Qa1R/KxRlMA3zckO80mO9X -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- The following command creates a certificate request on the enigma system:# ikecert certlocal -kc -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 \ > -D "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo\, Inc., OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" \ > -A "DN=C=JA, O=EnigmaCo\, Inc., OU=JA-Enigmax" Creating software private keys. … Finished successfully. -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIBuDCCASECAQAwSTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFTATBgNVBAoTDFBhcnR5Q29tcGFu … 8qlqdjaStLGfhDOO -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- Submit the certificate request to a PKI organization.The PKI organization can tell you how to submit the certificate request. Most organizations have a web site with a submission form. The form requires proof that the submission is legitimate. Typically, you paste your certificate request into the form. When your request has been checked by the organization, the organization issues you the following two certificate objects and a list of revoked certificates:Your public key certificate – This certificate is based on the request that you submitted to the organization. The request that you submitted is part of this public key certificate. The certificate uniquely identifies you. A Certificate Authority – The organization's signature. The CA verifies that your public key certificate is legitimate. A Certificate Revocation List (CRL) – The latest list of certificates that the organization has revoked. The CRL is not sent separately as a certificate object if access to the CRL is embedded in the public key certificate.When a URI for the CRL is embedded in the public key certificate, IKE can automatically retrieve the CRL for you. Similarly, when a DN (directory name on an LDAP server) entry is embedded in the public key certificate, IKE can retrieve and cache the CRL from an LDAP server that you specify.See How to Handle a Certificate Revocation List for an example of an embedded URI and an embedded DN entry in a public key certificate. Add each certificate to your system.The a option to the ikecert certdb -a adds the pasted object to the appropriate certificate database on your system. For more information, see IKE With Public Key Certificates.On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser. Add the public key certificate that you received from the PKI organization.# ikecert certdb -a Press the Return key Paste the certificate: -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- … -----END X509 CERTIFICATE---- Press the Return key <Control>-D Add the CA from the PKI organization.# ikecert certdb -a Press the Return key Paste the CA: -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- … -----END X509 CERTIFICATE---- Press the Return key <Control>-D If the PKI organization has sent a list of revoked certificates, add the CRL to the certrldb database:# ikecert certrldb -a Press the Return key Paste the CRL: -----BEGIN CRL----- … -----END CRL---- Press the Return key <Control>-D Use the cert_root keyword to identify the PKI organization in the /etc/inet/ike/config file.Use the name that the PKI organization provides.For example, the ike/config file on the partym system might appear similar to the following:# Trusted root cert # This certificate is from Example PKI # This is the X.509 distinguished name for the CA that it issues. cert_root "C=US, O=ExamplePKI\, Inc., OU=PKI-Example, CN=Example PKI" ## Parameters that may also show up in rules. p1_xform { auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 1 auth_alg sha1 encr_alg des } p2_pfs 2 { label "US-partym to JA-enigmax - Example PKI" local_id_type dn local_id "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" remote_id "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" local_addr 192.168.13.213 remote_addr 192.168.116.16 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 2 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des} }All arguments to the auth_method parameter must be on the same line. On the enigma system, create a similar file.Specifically, the enigma ike/config file should do the following:Include the same cert_root value. Use enigma values for local parameters. Use partym values for remote parameters. Create a unique value for the label keyword. This value must be different from the remote system's label value. … cert_root "C=US, O=ExamplePKI\, Inc., OU=PKI-Example, CN=Example PKI" … { label "JA-enigmax to US-partym - Example PKI" local_id_type dn local_id "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" remote_id "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" local_addr 192.168.116.16 remote_addr 192.168.13.213 … Tell IKE how to handle CRLs.Choose the appropriate option:No CRL availableIf the PKI organization does not provide a CRL, add the keyword ignore_crls to the ike/config file.# Trusted root cert … cert_root "C=US, O=ExamplePKI\, Inc., OU=PKI-Example,… ignore_crls …The ignore_crls keyword tells IKE not to search for CRLs. CRL availableIf the PKI organization provides a central distribution point for CRLs, you can modify the ike/config file to point to that location.See How to Handle a Certificate Revocation List for examples. When you use auth_method rsa_encrypt in the ike/config file, you must add the peer's certificate to the publickeys database.Send the certificate to the remote system's administrator. You can paste the certificate into an email.For example, the partym administrator would send the following email:To: admin@ja.enigmaexample.com From: admin@us.partyexample.com Message: -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MII… ----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----The enigma administrator would send the following email:To: admin@us.partyexample.com From: admin@ja.enigmaexample.com Message: -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MII … -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- On each system, add the emailed certificate to the local publickeys database. # ikecert certdb -a Press the Return key -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MII… -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- Press the Return key <Control>-D The authentication method for RSA encryption hides identities in IKE from eavesdroppers. Because the rsa_encrypt method hides the peer's identity, IKE cannot retrieve the peer's certificate. As a result, the rsa_encrypt method requires that the IKE peers know each other's public keys.Therefore, when you use an auth_method of rsa_encrypt in the /etc/inet/ike/config file, you must add the peer's certificate to the publickeys database. The publickeys database then holds three certificates for each communicating pair of systems:Your public key certificate The CA certificate The peer's public key certificate Troubleshooting – The IKE payload, which includes the three certificates, can become too large for rsa_encrypt to encrypt. Errors such as “authorization failed” and “malformed payload” can indicate that the rsa_encrypt method cannot encrypt the total payload. Reduce the size of the payload by using a method, such as rsa_sig, that requires only two certificates. Generating and storing public key certificates on hardware is similar to generating and storing public key certificates on your system. On hardware, the ikecert certlocal and ikecert certdb commands must identify the hardware. The T option with the token ID identifies the hardware to the commands. The hardware must be configured. The hardware uses the /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so library unless the pkcs11_path keyword in the /etc/inet/ike/config file points to a different library. The library must be implemented according to the following standard: RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki), that is, a PKCS #11 library.See How to Configure IKE to Find the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 Board for setup instructions. On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Generate a self-signed certificate or a certificate request, and specify the token ID.Choose one of the following options:The Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board supports keys up to 2048 bits for RSA. For DSA, this board supports keys up to 1024 bits. For a self-signed certificate, use this syntax.# ikecert certlocal -ks -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 \ > -D "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" \ > -a -T dca0-accel-stor IP=192.168.116.16 Creating hardware private keys. Enter PIN for PKCS#11 token: Type user:passwordThe argument to the T option is the token ID from the attached Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board. For a certificate request, use this syntax.# ikecert certlocal -kc -m 1024 -t rsa-md5 \ > -D "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" \ > -a -T dca0-accel-stor IP=192.168.116.16 Creating hardware private keys. Enter PIN for PKCS#11 token: Type user:password For a description of the arguments to the ikecert command, see the ikecert1M man page. At the prompt for a PIN, type the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 user, a colon, and the user's password. If the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board has a user ikemgr whose password is rgm4tigt, you would type the following:Enter PIN for PKCS#11 token: ikemgr:rgm4tigtThe PIN response is stored on disk as clear text. After you type the password, the certificate prints out:Enter PIN for PKCS#11 token: ikemgr:rgm4tigt -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MIIBuDCCASECAQAwSTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFTATBgNVBAoTDFBhcnR5Q29tcGFu … oKUDBbZ9O/pLWYGr -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- Send your certificate for use by the other party.Choose one of the following options:Send the self-signed certificate to the remote system.You can paste the certificate into an email. Send the certificate request to an organization that handles PKI.Follow the instructions of the PKI organization to submit the certificate request. For a more detailed discussion, see Step 3 of How to Configure IKE With Certificates Signed by a CA. On your system, edit the /etc/inet/ike/config file to recognize the certificates.Choose one of the following options.Self-signed certificateUse the values that the administrator of the remote system provides for the cert_trust, remote_id, and remote_addr parameters. For example, on the enigma system, the ike/config file would appear similar to the following:# Explicitly trust the following self-signed certs # Use the Subject Alternate Name to identify the cert cert_trust "192.168.116.16" Local system's certificate Subject Alt Name cert_trust "192.168.13.213" Remote system's certificate Subject Alt name # Solaris 10 1/06 release: default path does not have to be typed in #pkcs11_path "/usr/lib/libpkcs11.so" Hardware connection # Solaris 10 release: use this path #pkcs11_path "/opt/SUNWconn/cryptov2/lib/libvpkcs11.so" … { label "JA-enigmax to US-partym" local_id_type dn local_id "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" remote_id "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" local_addr 192.168.116.16 remote_addr 192.168.13.213 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 2 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des} } Certificate requestType the name that the PKI organization provides as the value for the cert_root keyword. For example, the ike/config file on the enigma system might appear similar to the following:# Trusted root cert # This certificate is from Example PKI # This is the X.509 distinguished name for the CA that it issues. cert_root "C=US, O=ExamplePKI\, Inc., OU=PKI-Example, CN=Example PKI" # Solaris 10 1/06 release: default path does not have to be typed in #pkcs11_path "/usr/lib/libpkcs11.so" Hardware connection # Solaris 10 release: use this path #pkcs11_path "/opt/SUNWconn/cryptov2/lib/libvpkcs11.so" … { label "JA-enigmax to US-partym - Example PKI" local_id_type dn local_id "C=JA, O=EnigmaCo, OU=JA-Enigmax, CN=Enigmax" remote_id "C=US, O=PartyCompany, OU=US-Partym, CN=Partym" local_addr 192.168.116.16 remote_addr 192.168.13.213 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 2 auth_alg md5 encr_alg 3des} } Place the certificates from the other party in the hardware.Respond to the PIN request as you responded in Step 3.You must add the public key certificates to the same attached hardware that generated your private key. Self-signed certificate.Add the remote system's self-signed certificate. In this example, the certificate is stored in the file, DCA.ACCEL.STOR.CERT.# ikecert certdb -a -T dca0-accel-stor < DCA.ACCEL.STOR.CERT Enter PIN for PKCS#11 token: Type user:passwordIf the self-signed certificate used rsa_encrypt as the value for the auth_method parameter, add the peer's certificate to the hardware store. Certificates from a PKI organization.Add the certificate that the organization generated from your certificate request, and add the certificate authority (CA).# ikecert certdb -a -T dca0-accel-stor < DCA.ACCEL.STOR.CERT Enter PIN for PKCS#11 token: Type user:password# ikecert certdb -a -T dca0-accel-stor < DCA.ACCEL.STOR.CA.CERT Enter PIN for PKCS#11 token: Type user:passwordTo add a certificate revocation list (CRL) from the PKI organization, see How to Handle a Certificate Revocation List. A certificate revocation list (CRL) contains outdated or compromised certificates from a Certificate Authority. You have four ways to handle CRLs.You must instruct IKE to ignore CRLs if your CA organization does not issue CRLs. This option is shown in Step 6 in How to Configure IKE With Certificates Signed by a CA. You can instruct IKE to access the CRLs from a URI (uniform resource indicator) whose address is embedded in the public key certificate from the CA. You can instruct IKE to access the CRLs from an LDAP server whose DN (directory name) entry is embedded in the public key certificate from the CA. You can provide the CRL as an argument to the ikecert certrldb command. For an example, see Example 23–4. The following procedure describes how to instruct IKE to use CRLs from a central distribution point. Display the certificate that you received from the CA.# ikecert certdb -lv certspeclLists certificates in the IKE certificate database. vLists the certificates in verbose mode. Use this option with care. certspecIs a pattern that matches a certificate in the IKE certificate database. For example, the following certificate was issued by Sun Microsystems. Details have been altered.# ikecert certdb -lv example-protect.sun.com Certificate Slot Name: 0 Type: dsa-sha1 (Private key in certlocal slot 0) Subject Name: <O=Sun Microsystems Inc, CN=example-protect.sun.com> Issuer Name: <CN=Sun Microsystems Inc CA (Cl B), O=Sun Microsystems Inc> SerialNumber: 14000D93 Validity: Not Valid Before: 2002 Jul 19th, 21:11:11 GMT Not Valid After: 2005 Jul 18th, 21:11:11 GMT Public Key Info: Public Modulus (n) (2048 bits): C575A…A5 Public Exponent (e) ( 24 bits): 010001 Extensions: Subject Alternative Names: DNS = example-protect.sun.com Key Usage: DigitalSignature KeyEncipherment [CRITICAL] CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI = #Ihttp://www.sun.com/pki/pkismica.crl#i DN = <CN=Sun Microsystems Inc CA (Cl B), O=Sun Microsystems Inc> CRL Issuer: Authority Key ID: Key ID: 4F … 6B SubjectKeyID: A5 … FD Certificate Policies Authority Information AccessNotice the CRL Distribution Points entry. The URI entry indicates that this organization's CRL is available on the web. The DN entry indicates that the CRL is available on an LDAP server. Once accessed by IKE, the CRL is cached for further use.To access the CRL, you need to reach a distribution point. Choose one of the following methods to access the CRL from a central distribution point.Use the URI.Add the keyword use_http to the host's /etc/inet/ike/config file. For example, the ike/config file would appear similar to the following:# Use CRL from organization's URI use_http … Use a web proxy.Add the keyword proxy to the ike/config file. The proxy keyword takes a URL as an argument, as in the following:# Use own web proxy proxy "http://proxy1:8080" Use an LDAP server.Name the LDAP server as an argument to the ldap-list keyword in the host's /etc/inet/ike/config file. Your organization provides the name of the LDAP server. The entry in the ike/config file would appear similar to the following:# Use CRL from organization's LDAP ldap-list "ldap1.sun.com:389,ldap2.sun.com" … IKE retrieves the CRL and caches the CRL until the certificate expires. If the PKI organization's CRL is not available from a central distribution point, you can add the CRL manually to the local certrldb database. Follow the PKI organization's instructions for extracting the CRL into a file, then add the CRL to the database with the ikecert certrldb -a command.# ikecert certrldb -a < Sun.Cert.CRL The following table points to procedures to configure IKE to handle systems that log in remotely to a central site.Task Description For Instructions Communicate with a central site from off-site Enables off-site systems to communicate with a central site. The off-site systems might be mobile. How to Configure IKE for Off-Site Systems Use a root certificate and IKE on a central system that accepts traffic from mobile systems Configures a gateway system to accept IPsec traffic from a system that does not have a fixed IP address. Example 23–5 Use a root certificate and IKE on a system that does not have a fixed IP address Configures a mobile system to protect its traffic to a central site, such as company headquarters. Example 23–6 Use self-signed certificates and IKE on a central system that accepts traffic from mobile systems Configures a gateway system with self-signed certificates to accept IPsec traffic from a mobile system. Example 23–7 Use self-signed certificates and IKE on a system that does not have a fixed IP address Configures a mobile system with self-signed certificates to protect its traffic to a central site. Example 23–8 When configured properly, home offices and mobile laptops can use IPsec and IKE to communicate with their company's central computers. A blanket IPsec policy that is combined with a public key authentication method enables off-site systems to protect their traffic to a central system.IPsec and IKE require a unique ID to identify source and destination. For off-site or mobile systems that do not have a unique IP address, you must use another ID type. ID types such as DNS, DN, or email can be used to uniquely identify a system. Off-site or mobile systems that have unique IP addresses are still best configured with a different ID type. For example, if the systems attempt to connect to a central site from behind a NAT box, their unique addresses are not used. A NAT box assigns an arbitrary IP address, which the central system would not recognize.Preshared keys also do not work well as an authentication mechanism for mobile systems, because preshared keys require fixed IP addresses. Self-signed certificates, or certificates from a PKI enable mobile systems to communicate with the central site. On the system console of the central system, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Configure the central system to recognize mobile systems.Set up the /etc/hosts file.The central system does not have to recognize specific addresses for the mobile systems.# /etc/hosts on central central 192.xxx.xxx.x Set up the ipsecinit.conf file.The central system needs a policy that allows a wide range of IP addresses. Later, certificates in the IKE policy ensure that the connecting systems are legitimate.# /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf on central # Keep everyone out unless they use this IPsec policy: {} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs md5 sa shared} Set up the ike.config file.DNS identifies the central system. Certificates are used to authenticate the system.## /etc/inet/ike/ike.config on central # Global parameters # # Find CRLs by URI, URL, or LDAP # Use CRL from organization's URI use_http # # Use web proxy proxy "http://somecache.domain:port/" # # Use LDAP server ldap_server "ldap-server1.domain.org,ldap2.domain.org:port" # # List CA-signed certificates cert_root "C=US, O=Domain Org, CN=Domain STATE" # # List self-signed certificates - trust server and enumerated others #cert_trust "DNS=central.domain.org" #cert_trust "DNS=mobile.domain.org" #cert_trust "DN=CN=Domain Org STATE (CLASS), O=Domain Org #cert_trust "email=root@central.domain.org" #cert_trust "email=user1@mobile.domain.org" # # Rule for mobile systems with certificate { label "Mobile systems with certificate" local_id_type DNS # Any mobile system who knows my DNS or IP can find me. local_id "central.domain.org" local_addr 192.xxx.xxx.x # Root certificate ensures trust, # so allow any remote_id and any remote IP address. remote_id "" remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0 p2_pfs 5 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg blowfish auth_alg md5 } } Log in to each mobile system, and configure the system to find the central system.Set up the /etc/hosts file.The /etc/hosts file does not need an address for the mobile system, but can provide one. The file must contain a public IP address for the central system.# /etc/hosts on mobile mobile 10.x.x.xx central 192.xxx.xxx.x Set up the ipsecinit.conf file.The mobile system needs to find the central system by its public IP address. The systems must configure the same IPsec policy.# /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf on mobile # Find central {raddr 192.xxx.xxx.x} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs md5 sa shared} Set up the ike.config file. The identifier cannot be an IP address. The following identifiers are valid for mobile systems:DN=ldap-directory-name DNS=domain-name-server-address email=email-address Certificates are used to authenticate the mobile system.## /etc/inet/ike/ike.config on mobile # Global parameters # # Find CRLs by URI, URL, or LDAP # Use CRL from organization's URI use_http # # Use web proxy proxy "http://somecache.domain:port/" # # Use LDAP server ldap_server "ldap-server1.domain.org,ldap2.domain.org:port" # # List CA-signed certificates cert_root "C=US, O=Domain Org, CN=Domain STATE" # # Self-signed certificates - trust me and enumerated others #cert_trust "DNS=mobile.domain.org" #cert_trust "DNS=central.domain.org" #cert_trust "DN=CN=Domain Org STATE (CLASS), O=Domain Org #cert_trust "email=user1@domain.org" #cert_trust "email=root@central.domain.org" # # Rule for off-site systems with root certificate { label "Off-site mobile with certificate" local_id_type DNS # NAT-T can translate local_addr into any public IP address # central knows me by my DNS local_id "mobile.domain.org" local_addr 0.0.0.0/0 # Find central and trust the root certificate remote_id "central.domain.org" remote_addr 192.xxx.xxx.x p2_pfs 5 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg blowfish auth_alg md5 } } Reboot each system when it is configured.Or, stop and start the in.iked daemon. IKE can initiate negotiations from behind a NAT box. However, the ideal setup for IKE is without an intervening NAT box. In the following example, root certificates have been issued by a CA. The CA certificates have been placed on the mobile system and the central system. A central system accepts IPsec negotiations from a system behind a NAT box. main1 is the company system that can accept connections from off-site systems. To set up the off-site systems, see Example 23–6.## /etc/hosts on main1 main1 192.168.0.100## /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf on main1 # Keep everyone out unless they use this IPsec policy: {} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs md5 sa shared}## /etc/inet/ike/ike.config on main1 # Global parameters # # Find CRLs by URI, URL, or LDAP # Use CRL from organization's URI use_http # # Use web proxy proxy "http://cache1.domain.org:8080/" # # Use LDAP server ldap_server "ldap1.domain.org,ldap2.domain.org:389" # # List CA-signed certificate cert_root "C=US, O=ExamplePKI Inc, OU=PKI-Example, CN=Example PKI" # # Rule for off-site systems with root certificate { label "Off-site system with root certificate" local_id_type DNS local_id "main1.domain.org" local_addr 192.168.0.100 # Root certificate ensures trust, # so allow any remote_id and any remote IP address. remote_id "" remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0 p2_pfs 5 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg blowfish auth_alg md5} p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg 3des auth_alg md5} p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg blowfish auth_alg sha} p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg 3des auth_alg sha} } In the following example, root certificates have been issued by a CA and placed on the mobile system and the central system. mobile1 is connecting to the company headquarters from home. The Internet service provider (ISP) network uses a NAT box to enable the ISP to assign mobile1 a private address. The NAT box then translates the private address into a public IP address that is shared with other ISP network nodes. Company headquarters is not behind a NAT. For setting up the computer at company headquarters, see Example 23–5.## /etc/hosts on mobile1 mobile1 10.1.3.3 main1 192.168.0.100## /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf on mobile1 # Find main1 {raddr 192.168.0.100} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs md5 sa shared}## /etc/inet/ike/ike.config on mobile1 # Global parameters # # Find CRLs by URI, URL, or LDAP # Use CRL from organization's URI use_http # # Use web proxy proxy "http://cache1.domain.org:8080/" # # Use LDAP server ldap_server "ldap1.domain.org,ldap2.domain.org:389" # # List CA-signed certificate cert_root "C=US, O=ExamplePKI Inc, OU=PKI-Example, CN=Example PKI" # # Rule for off-site systems with root certificate { label "Off-site mobile1 with root certificate" local_id_type DNS local_id "mobile1.domain.org" local_addr 0.0.0.0/0 # Find main1 and trust the root certificate remote_id "main1.domain.org" remote_addr 192.168.0.100 p2_pfs 5 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg blowfish auth_alg md5 } } In the following example, self-signed certificates have been issued and are on the mobile and the central system. main1 is the company system that can accept connections from off-site systems. To set up the off-site systems, see Example 23–8.## /etc/hosts on main1 main1 192.168.0.100## /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf on main1 # Keep everyone out unless they use this IPsec policy: {} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs md5 sa shared}## /etc/inet/ike/ike.config on main1 # Global parameters # # Self-signed certificates - trust me and enumerated others cert_trust "DNS=main1.domain.org" cert_trust "jdoe@domain.org" cert_trust "user2@domain.org" cert_trust "user3@domain.org" # # Rule for off-site systems with trusted certificate { label "Off-site systems with trusted certificates" local_id_type DNS local_id "main1.domain.org" local_addr 192.168.0.100 # Trust the self-signed certificates # so allow any remote_id and any remote IP address. remote_id "" remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0 p2_pfs 5 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg blowfish auth_alg md5 } } In the following example, mobile1 is connecting to the company headquarters from home. The certificates have been issued and placed on the mobile and the central system. The ISP network uses a NAT box to enable the ISP to assign mobile1 a private address. The NAT box then translates the private address into a public IP address that is shared with other ISP network nodes. Company headquarters is not behind a NAT. To set up the computer at company headquarters, see Example 23–7.## /etc/hosts on mobile1 mobile1 10.1.3.3 main1 192.168.0.100## /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf on mobile1 # Find main1 {raddr 192.168.0.100} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs md5 sa shared}## /etc/inet/ike/ike.config on mobile1 # Global parameters # Self-signed certificates - trust me and the central system cert_trust "jdoe@domain.org" cert_trust "DNS=main1.domain.org" # # Rule for off-site systems with trusted certificate { label "Off-site mobile1 with trusted certificate" local_id_type email local_id "jdoe@domain.org" local_addr 0.0.0.0/0 # Find main1 and trust the certificate remote_id "main1.domain.org" remote_addr 192.168.0.100 p2_pfs 5 p1_xform {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 5 encr_alg blowfish auth_alg md5 } } The following table points to procedures that inform IKE about attached hardware. You must inform IKE about attached hardware before IKE can use the hardware. To use the hardware, follow the hardware procedures in Configuring IKE With Public Key Certificates.Task Description For Instructions Offload IKE key operations to the Sun Crypto Accelerator 1000 board Links IKE to the PKCS #11 library. How to Configure IKE to Find the Sun Crypto Accelerator 1000 Board Offload IKE key operations and store the keys on the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board Links IKE to the PKCS #11 library and lists the name of the attached hardware. How to Configure IKE to Find the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 Board Public key certificates can also be stored on attached hardware, the Sun Crypto Accelerator 1000 board and the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board. With the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board, public key operations can also be offloaded from the system to the board.The following procedure assumes that a Sun Crypto Accelerator 1000 board is attached to the system. The procedure also assumes that the software for the board has been installed and that the software has been configured. For instructions, see the Sun Crypto Accelerator 1000 Board Version 1.1 Installation and User's Guide. On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Check that the library is linked.Type the following command to determine whether a PKCS #11 library is linked:# ikeadm get stats Phase 1 SA counts: Current: initiator: 0 responder: 0 Total: initiator: 0 responder: 0 Attempted: initiator: 0 responder: 0 Failed: initiator: 0 responder: 0 initiator fails include 0 time-out(s) PKCS#11 library linked in from /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so # Solaris 10 1/06: In this release, you can store keys in the softtoken keystore.For information on the keystore that is provided by the Solaris cryptographic framework, see the cryptoadm1M man page. For an example of using the keystore, see Example 23–9. The following procedure assumes that a Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board is attached to the system. The procedure also assumes that the software for the board has been installed and that the software has been configured. For instructions, see the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 Board Installation and User's Guide. The guide is available from the Sun Hardware Documentation web site, under Network and Security Products. On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Check that the PKCS #11 library is linked.IKE uses the library's routines to handle key generation and key storage on the Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board. Type the following command to determine whether a PKCS #11 library has been linked:$ ikeadm get stats … PKCS#11 library linked in from /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so $The Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board supports keys up to 2048 bits for RSA. For DSA, this board supports keys up to 1024 bits. Find the token ID for the attached Sun Crypto Accelerator 4000 board.$ ikecert tokens Available tokens with library "/usr/lib/libpkcs11.so": "Sun Metaslot "The library returns a token ID, also called a keystore name, of 32 characters. In this example, you could use the Sun Metaslot token with the ikecert commands to store and to accelerate IKE keys.For instructions on how to use the token, see How to Generate and Store Public Key Certificates on Hardware.The trailing spaces are automatically padded by the ikecert command. Tokens can be stored on disk, on an attached board, or in the softtoken keystore that the Solaris encryption framework provides. The softtoken keystore token ID might resemble the following.$ ikecert tokens Available tokens with library "/usr/lib/libpkcs11.so": "Sun Metaslot "To create a passphrase for the softtoken keystore, see the pktool1 man page.A command that resembles the following would add a certificate to the softtoken keystore. Sun.Metaslot.cert is a file that contains the CA certificate:# ikecert certdb -a -T "Sun Metaslot" < Sun.Metaslot.cert Enter PIN for PKCS#11 token: Type user:passphrase The following table points to procedures to configure transmission parameters for IKE.Task Description For Instructions Make key negotiation more efficient Changes the key negotiation parameters. How to Change the Duration of Phase 1 IKE Key Negotiation Configure key negotiation to allow for delays in transmission Lengthens the key negotiation parameters. Example 23–10 Configure key negotiation to succeed quickly, or to show failures quickly Shortens the key negotiation parameters. Example 23–11 When IKE negotiates keys, the speed of transmission can affect the success of the negotiation. Normally, you would not need to change the default values for IKE transmission parameters. However, when optimizing key negotiation over very dirty lines, or when reproducing a problem, you might want to change the transmission values.Longer duration times enable IKE to negotiate keys over unreliable transmission lines. You can lengthen certain parameters so that initial attempts succeed. If the initial attempt does not succeed, you can space subsequent attempts to offer more time for success.Shorter duration times enable you to take advantage of reliable transmission lines. You can more quickly retry a failed negotiation to speed up the negotiation. When diagnosing a problem, you might also want to speed up the negotiation for a quick failure. Shorter durations also enable the Phase 1 SAs to be used for their lifetime.On the system console, assume the Primary Administrator role or become superuser.The Primary Administrator role includes the Primary Administrator profile. To create the role and assign the role to a user, see Chapter 2, Working With the Solaris Management Console (Tasks), in System Administration Guide: Basic Administration.Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session. Change the default values of the global transmission parameters on each system.On each system, modify Phase 1 duration parameters the /etc/inet/ike/config file.### ike/config file on system ## Global parameters # ## Phase 1 transform defaults # #expire_timer 300 #retry_limit 5 #retry_timer_init 0.5 (integer or float) #retry_timer_max 30 (integer or float)expire_timerThe number of seconds to let a not-yet-complete IKE Phase I negotiation linger before deleting the negotiation attempt. By default, the attempt lingers for 30 seconds. retry_limitThe number of retransmits before any IKE negotiation is aborted. By default, IKE tries five times. retry_timer_initThe initial interval between retransmits. This interval is doubled until the retry_timer_max value is reached. The initial interval is 0.5 seconds. retry_timer_maxThe maximum interval in seconds between retransmits. The retransmit interval stops growing at this limit. By default, the limit is 30 seconds. Reboot the system.Or, stop and start the in.iked daemon. In the following example, a system is connected to its IKE peers by a high-traffic transmission line. The original settings are in comments in the file. The new settings lengthen the negotiation time.### ike/config file on partym ## Global Parameters # ## Phase 1 transform defaults #expire_timer 300 #retry_limit 5 #retry_timer_init 0.5 (integer or float) #retry_timer_max 30 (integer or float) # expire_timer 600 retry_limit 10 retry_timer_init 2.5 retry_timer_max 180 In the following example, a system is connected to its IKE peers by a high-speed line with little traffic. The original settings are in comments in the file. The new settings shorten the negotiation time.### ike/config file on partym ## Global Parameters # ## Phase 1 transform defaults #expire_timer 300 #retry_limit 5 #retry_timer_init 0.5 (integer or float) #retry_timer_max 30 (integer or float) # expire_timer 120 retry_timer_init 0.20